06 Beam Instrumentation, Controls, Feedback, and Operational Aspects
T23 Machine Protection
Paper Title Page
WEPAF013 Database for the Management of NSLS-II Active Interlock System 1841
 
  • J. Choi, R.P. Fliller, K. Ha, Y. Tian
    BNL, Upton, Long Island, New York, USA
 
  Funding: DOE Contract No. DE-SC0012704
NSLS-II is operating the active interlock (AI) system to protect the machine components from the synchrotron radiation from the accidentally mis-steered electron beam. For the systematic management, a relational database is dedicated to the AI system and working as the data provider as well as the archiver. The paper shows how the database is structured and used for the AI system.
 
DOI • reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2018-WEPAF013  
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WEPAF053 Status and Commissioning of the European XFEL Beam Loss Monitor System 1940
 
  • T. Wamsat, T. Lensch, P.A. Smirnov
    DESY, Hamburg, Germany
 
  The European XFEL MTCA based Beam Loss Monitor System (BLM) is composed of about 450 monitors, which are part of the Machine Protection System (MPS). The BLMs detect losses of the electron beam, in order to protect accelerator components from damage and excessive activation, in particular the undulators, since they are made of permanent magnets. Also each cold accelerating module is equipped with a BLM to measure the sudden onset of field emission (dark current) in cavities. In addition some BLMs are used as detectors for wire- scanners. Experience from the already running BLM system in FLASH2 which is based on the same technology, led to a fast implementation of the system in the XFEL. Further firmware and server developments related to alarm generation and handling are ongoing. The BLM systems structure, the current status and the different possibilities to trigger alarms which stop the electron beam will be presented.  
DOI • reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2018-WEPAF053  
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WEPAF064 Dependable Implementation of the Beam Interlock Mechanism in CERN Power Converter Controllers 1975
 
  • M. Di Cosmo, Q. King, R. Murillo-Garcia, D. Nisbet, B. Todd
    CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
 
  At CERN a Beam Interlock System (BIS) protects accelerators from accidental and uncontrolled release of beam energy, avoiding machine downtime. Throughout the accelerator complex numerous critical subsystems, including power converters, interact with the BIS indicating their readiness for operation with beam. Power converters play a vital role in establishing operational conditions, and an unmitigated power converter malfunction could lead to damage to the machine. For example a bending magnet converter set at an incorrect current would result in an incorrect field strength, and beam passing through this may impact and damage the machine. A fast and dependable Beam Interlock Mechanism is required between power converters and BIS, verifying that voltage and current levels are within tolerances. This paper describes the design and realisation of the Beam Interlock Mechanism, based on CERN's Function Generator Controller (FGC), the central processing unit power converter control. Particular emphasis is placed on the system architecture required to assure the integrity of the power converter parameters, and the protection of the CERN accelerator complex.  
DOI • reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2018-WEPAF064  
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WEPAF081 An Enhanced Quench Detection System for Main Quadrupole Magnets in the Large Hadron Collider 2032
 
  • J. Spasic, D.O. Calcoen, R. Denz, V. Froidbise, S. Georgakakis, T. Podzorny, A.P. Siemko, J. Steckert
    CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
 
  To further improve the performance and reliability of the quench detection system (QDS) for main quadrupole magnets in the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), there is a planned upgrade of the system during the long shutdown period of the LHC in 2019-2020. While improving the already existing functionalities of quench detection for quadrupole magnets and field-bus data acquisition, the enhanced QDS will incorporate new functionalities to strengthen and improve the system operation and maintenance. The new functionalities comprise quench heater supervision, interlock loop monitoring, power cycling possibility for the whole QDS and its data acquisition part, monitoring and synchronization of trigger signals, and monitoring of power supplies. In addition, the system will have two redundant power supply feeds. Given that the enhanced QDS units will replace the existing QDS units in the LHC tunnel, the units will be exposed to elevated levels of ionizing radiation. Therefore, it is necessary to design a radiation tolerant detection system. In this work, an overview of the design solution for such enhanced QDS is presented.  
DOI • reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2018-WEPAF081  
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WEPAF088 Machine Protection Features of the ESS Beam Current Monitor System 2058
 
  • H. Hassanzadegan, E. Bargalló, S.G. Gabourin, T. Korhonen, S. Kövecses de Carvalho, A. Nordt, T.J. Shea
    ESS, Lund, Sweden
  • M. Mohammednezhad
    Sigma Connectivity Engineering, Lund, Sweden
  • M. Werner
    DESY, Hamburg, Germany
 
  The BCM system of the European Spallation Source includes several machine protection features to ensure that the actual beam parameters will be consistent with the selected beam and destination modes. Differential current measurements with several ACCT pairs are foreseen to detect beam losses particularly in the low-energy linac where Beam Loss Monitors cannot be used. The ACCTs will also be used to check that no beam will be present in the sections downstream of a temporary beam dump. These measurements will then be used to stop the beam shortly after an abnormal condition has been detected by the BCM system. This will require some customized interfaces with the Timing System and the Machine Protection System as well as an optical interface for differential current measurement over large distances. Automatic setting of the machine protection thresholds and masking/unmasking of the interlocks based on the beam and destination modes are among the technical complexities. This paper gives an overview of the design including the most recent updates and discusses in more details the machine protection features of the BCM system.  
DOI • reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2018-WEPAF088  
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WEPAL068 Improving Machine and Target Protection in the SINQ Beam Line at PSI-HIPA 2337
 
  • D. Reggiani, P.-A. Duperrex, R. Dölling, D.C. Kiselev, J. Welte, M. Wohlmuther
    PSI, Villigen PSI, Switzerland
 
  With a nominal beam power of nearly 1.4 MW, the PSI High Intensity Proton Accelerator (HIPA) facility is currently at the forefront of the high intensity frontier of particle accelerators. A key issue of this facility is to ensure safe operation of the SINQ spallation source. In particular, too large beam current density and/or inaccurate beam steering can seriously compromise the integrity of the spallation target. Recently, a campaign has been launched in order to improve the fast detection of improper beam delivery and therefore the reliability of the system. New beam diagnostics elements such as an absolute intensity monitor, a beam ellipticity monitor and additional loss monitors have been installed during the 2017 shutdown. In 2018 a new SINQ target will be installed featuring a system of thermocouples which will keep track of the beam position. Moreover, an additional monitor is currently under study which should reliably detect small beam fractions accidentally bypassing the muon production target TE and which are intrinsically dangerous for the SINQ spallation target. This contribution reviews the all efforts to increase the efficiency of the SINQ protection system.  
DOI • reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2018-WEPAL068  
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THPML077 Status of the Machine Protection System for ARIEL e-linac 4829
 
  • M. Alcorta, D. Dale, H. Hui, S.R. Koscielniak, K. Langton, K. LeBlanc, M. Rowe
    TRIUMF, Vancouver, Canada
 
  The Advanced Rare Isotope & Electron Linac (ARIEL) facility at TRIUMF consists of an electron linear accelerator (e-linac) capable of currents up to 10 mA at an energy of 30 MeV, giving a total available beam power of 300 kW. In addition, the e-linac can be run in pulsed operation down to beam pulses of 5 µs, up to CW. A Machine Protection System (MPS) is required to protect the accelerator from hazardous beam spills and must turn off the electron gun within 10 µs of detection. The MPS consists of two types of beam loss monitors, a front-end beam loss monitor board developed at TRIUMF, and EPICS-based controls to establish operating modes. A trip time of 10 µs has been demonstrated, along with a 106 dynamic range and sensitivity down to 100 pA. This paper is focused on the current status of the beam loss monitor detection system.  
DOI • reference for this paper ※ https://doi.org/10.18429/JACoW-IPAC2018-THPML077  
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